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Disputes over Water Resources:
A History of Conflict and Cooperation in Drainage Basins
Shavkat Kasymov

Abstract
This paper presents the analysis of conflict history over freshwater in several drainage
basins across the planet. As will be demonstrated in this paper, unilateral water policies
have proved to reduce the role and prospect of water treaties and international water
sharing regimes, and led to political tensions and conflicts. The main argument of the
essay is that unilateral diversions of water flows will instigate wars between riparian
states because of the rising demand for freshwater in the future. Unilateral practices of
water diversion create a situation of inequitable distribution of water among nationstates within a basin which is a prerequisite for a sustainable conflict. State policies have
to aim to eliminate situations of inequitable distribution and increase accessibility to
clean drinking water for populations across a river basin based on their needs in order to
secure long-lasting peace and stability.
Introduction
The struggle for resources, whether material or symbolic, has always played a
pivotal role in the formation and shaping of societies and polities. Over time, with the
increase in world population and the number of nation-states, the intensity and quantity of
conflicts for natural resources has risen at an alarming rate. Conflicts over resources are
commonplace today as was the case for centuries earlier. How different is water and
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rivers in particular from other types of resources? Since rivers flow through territories of
different nation-states, the quantitative and qualitative utilization of water in one state
affects water use in another, downstream state. As the demand for freshwater in countries
grows, states become increasingly resolute in advocating their respective state rights and
in defending their economic interests. Rivers can easily become the object of a
disagreement, dispute and even conflict when the interest of one state is not accounted for
by a neighboring riparian state. (A riparian is referred to as a state whose territory a water
course traverses or whose boundary with another state a water course forms.)
In this paper, I will present the analysis of conflict history in three drainage
basins: the Aral Sea Basin, the Ganges-Brahmaputra River system, and the TigrisEuphrates River Basin. These river systems were selected on the basis of their history of
transnational disputes over exploitation of water resources. Although no major military
conflicts occurred in any of these basins, the inequitable distribution of water among
states and population groups resulted in political tensions that may further escalate into
warfare against the backdrop of the constantly growing demand and inadequate policies
of states.
Water is among the most precious resources on the planet and its importance will
inevitably grow given the changing climatic conditions and the rising demand. Roughly
97 percent of the water on the Earth is salt water and thus is not readily available for
drinking or agricultural purposes. Only 2.5 percent of the remaining water stocks are
freshwater, but even these are unevenly distributed spatially and temporarily. Two-thirds
of these freshwater resources are locked in glaciers and ice caps (Weinthal 2002). One of
the overriding realities of the early 21st century is the growing competition between
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countries for increasingly scarce water resources. Moreover, while the amount of
freshwater on Earth remains constant, the global population continues to increase. The
world currently has over 6.5 billion inhabitants, a figure which is projected to climb to
over 9 billion by 2050 (UN Population Division 2005). The result is less water on a per
capita basis and the growing competition for increasingly scarce water supplies. ―W
ater
is a finite and fixed resource, and the rise of the global population has progressively
reduced the world runoff per capita, from 40,000 m³ per person in 1800 to 6,840 m³ in
1995, estimated to fall further to 4,692 m³ by 2025‖ (Furlong, Gleditsch, and Hegre
2006). Currently, more than one billion people do not have access to clean drinking
water, and approximately 2.4 billion people do not have access to adequate sanitation.
Gleick (1998) indicates that an estimated 80 percent of the diseases in developing
countries are water-related. Every day 14 to 30 thousand people, mainly children and
elderly, die because of waterborne diseases, or due to water floods and droughts.
According to a United Nations study, the world‘s 263 international drainage basins
account for some 60% of global river flows (UNEP Atlas 2002). The study indicates that
around 40% of the world‘s population lives in these river basins, which form at least a
part of the territory of 145 countries.
Water has always been a critical element of the economies in the modern age as it
was the instrument of survival for ancient communities. Being a source of life, water
nourished civilizations, provided fuel for conflicts and friendship between groups of
people and individuals. Agriculture has always been and still remains the main source of
livelihood and subsistence in most countries and the foremost consumer of freshwater.
Nowadays, population growth creates pressures on agriculture, resulting in food
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deficiency and insecurity. The result is the unprecedented consumption of water across
the world. However, of the world‘s 263 internationally shared rivers, less than one in five
is the subject of a substantial international agreement on issues of environmental
protection, shared management, or water allocation (Conca and Dabelko 2002). Since
rivers provide a lion‘s share of freshwater, countries that share them are confronted with
the necessity of reconciling their needs and demands with those of the neighboring
countries because of the peculiar physical nature of rivers that makes them distinct from
other types of natural resources. Unlike fossil fuels, on which states tend to claim
absolute rights, rivers cannot be divided between the contending parties. Managing a
river collectively by a number of countries is the inevitable necessity that all countries
have to accept and achieve.
Many political leaders and pundits have consistently stressed that large-scale wars
may erupt over increasingly scarce freshwater in the future. For instance, the former
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan (2001) declared that ―
fierce competition
for freshwater may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.‖ The 2004
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wangari Maathai (2004) suggested that:
We face the ecological crises of deforestation, desertification, water
scarcity and a lack of biological diversification. Unless we properly
manage resources like forests, water, land, minerals, and oil, we will not
win the fight against poverty. And there will be no peace. Old conflicts
will rage on and new resource wars will erupt unless we change the path
we are on.
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Other experts have dismissed such arguments as largely exaggerated and political,
pointing to a substantial agreement among scholars that disputes over water resources fall
short of wars and generally result in cooperative agreements. Since 1814, around 300
treaties have been concluded about non-navigational issues relating to international water
resources (Weinthal 2002). Their line of research suggests that disputes over freshwater
generally lead to cooperation rather than conflict. According to it, the ―
water wars‖
argument does not correspond to a substantial agreement among scholars that for
policymakers, military force is always a matter of last resort. Multiple case studies
demonstrate that water disputes tend to fall short of conflict. For instance, Slovakia and
Hungary found themselves in a dispute over the Danube River and the GabcikovoNagymaros hydroelectric power plant project. However, unlike many cases of post-Cold
War interstate violence, the two countries brought their contention to the International
Court of Justice and averted direct military actions. The Mekong River Basin represents
another example of sustainable water cooperation, notwithstanding the decades of wars
between countries, as well as the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan.
However, in the latter case, the active role of the World Bank proved instrumental in
concluding a final water agreement.
Although experience suggests that acute water scarcity may be a factor leading to
the conclusion of a water agreement, many agreements have proved ineffective and
hardly went beyond the initial stages. Real cooperation has rarely been achieved. Zetoin
and Mirumachi (2008) challenge the view that water disputes result in cooperation rather
than war, arguing that ―
various degrees of intensity and methods of conducting conflict
tend to mask a conflict‘s existence‖ and suggest that while ―
a water conflict may fall
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short of acute violence, it still has very negative consequences that may be hidden under
an apparent air of cooperation.‖ As a rule, various forms of cooperation are produced by
the existence of power asymmetry among riparian nations. For instance, coerced
cooperation is predominant in those situations where there is hegemony of one state.
Many experts point out that Israel‘s military hegemony in the Jordan River basin resulted
in some form of coerced cooperation. Induced cooperation generally involves a third
party, yet the approach employed is significantly different from that of coerced
cooperation. Induced cooperation presupposes the application of incentives for
cooperation, instead of force. Non-partisan states and third-party institutions have the
greatest influence on the establishment of bilateral and multilateral water regimes among
riparian nations. The Indus Water Treaty is a good case in point where the World Bank
played a central role in inducing Pakistan and India to come to terms about a shared
management of their water supplies.
Establishing Water Regulation Regimes
There are two approaches as to how to regulate water sharing in a transboundary
river basin. The social planner approach revolves around a supranational structure which
is created to handle the water affairs among riparians. It assumes the delegation of
authority and responsibility by state parties to an intergovernmental organization which is
formed by their mutual and collective agreement:
A central planning authority who knows what is best for society – a social
planner who views the region as one planning unit. The social planner
maximizes regional welfare subject to all available water resources in the
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region and given all possible water utilizing sectors. In some instances, the
social planner also includes preferences. (Wolf 1996, 18)
The second approach centers on market regulation, whereby each riparian nation
pursues individual gains from the engagement in a basin-wide bargaining game. Game
theory provides a conceptual reference point for a market-driven water regime. The
efficient allocation of scarce water resources among states is achieved via market
approaches. However, Wolf questions the utility of the market-centered approach,
claiming that ―
economic considerations alone may not provide an acceptable solution to
water allocation problems, especially allocation disputes between nations‖ (Wolf 1996,
19).
Game theoretical approaches constitute the core of multiriparian water regimes.
The basic assumption of game theory is that decision makers are rational players, that
they are intelligent, so, while pursuing well-defined objectives, they take into account
other decision-makers‘ rationality and build expectations on their behavior (Dinar, Dinar,
McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007). The involved countries are acting as players with
specific options and thus form strategies according to the corresponding payoffs and the
counter-player‘s strategies (Eleni and Yannis 2008). Each country-player adopts a
certain strategy provoking the reaction of the opponent party, while all the actions are
characterized by a rational behavior aimed at the maximization of payoffs. ―
One of the
main characteristics of the theory is the cooperative approach, which can be utilized
effectively in competitive cases – proving the benefits of cooperation and converting the
players‘ relations in cooperative‖ (Eleni and Yannis 2008, 467). The overriding principle
is that a military conflict between states is unacceptable within the realm of game
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theoretical approaches. However, a conflict of interests is central to driving a market
water system. It facilitates the progress of a water regime. Open bargaining techniques
and the transparency of interactive processes between players provide strong conciliatory
mechanisms.
Yaron (2002) applies game theory models to assess the economic value of
cooperation and noncooperation between Israelis and Palestinians over their shared water
resources. He concludes that whether or not a solution to the regional water problem will
be of a cooperative or noncooperative nature will depend on several political, institutional
and economic considerations that may or may not be in place (Yaron 2002). Using a
game theory model, Dinar and Wolf (1994) evaluate the idea of trading hydroelectricity
for interbasin water transfers among neighboring nations. They attempt to develop a
broader, more realistic conceptual framework that addresses economic and political
issues. Their model allocates potential benefits from trade among cooperators. The main
findings are that economic merits exist for water transfers in the region, but political
considerations may harm the process.
As the process of globalization drives the world toward a more interconnected
realm of interdependent, albeit sovereign states, the nature of the norms that regulate the
relations between nation-states transforms rapidly. Unlike the traditional international
system of sovereign states, the yet infant transnational system of global governance seeks
to establish supranational laws, regulations, and institutions whose authority extends
beyond and within nation-states. Nation-states continue to exist, but they must be
subordinate to transnational authority and laws. This authority is exercised by the
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definitions of international law, transnational courts and myriad UN conventions that
establish global norms.
The UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(1997) embodies the first international effort to resolve the perpetual conflict of interests
over water use. It stresses the utilization of rivers in an ―
equitable and reasonable
manner‖, taking into consideration the geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic,
ecological and other factors of a national character, as well as the social and economic
needs of the watercourse states concerned. In addition, the Convention underscores that
the interests of all populations dependent on a watercourse be respected and supported by
all possible means.
Under the Convention, if an upstream country is in a dire need to construct a dam
in its territory, it has to be done in such a way as not to infringe the water rights of the
populations in the neighboring countries and not to cause a substantial harm to the
ecology of the entire basin. The UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses is considered to be an international framework agreement for
use by states in negotiating water disputes. Most importantly, it put to rest the
longstanding conflict between the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty, or the
Harmon Doctrine; and absolute territorial integrity. The Harmon Doctrine advocates for
the right of an upstream state to do as it wishes with the water in its territory—regardless
of the adverse affect on downstream states; whereas the Convention defends the right of a
downstream state to an uninterrupted flow of a fixed quantity of water from upstream
states. The main principle enshrined in the Convention is that of the limited territorial
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sovereignty. It underscores the equitable utilization and the obligation not to cause a
significant harm.
The Convention is to be used as a reference point in each of the transboundary
river basins. Today, however, most riparians tend to advocate for the principles that are in
line with their sovereign economic interests—that is, upstream countries often refer to the
principle of absolute territorial sovereignty when advocating their plans to unilaterally
use water flows; and downstream countries support the principle of absolute territorial
integrity because it renders their water flows unaltered. Only 16 out of 35 countries
needed for the Convention to enter into force have ratified, accepted, approved or
acceded to it (Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007). Solid basin-wide
cooperation requires the unanimous commitment to the principle of equitable utilization
of watercourses enshrined in the Convention and the subsequent participation in the
benefits derived from the water by all communities sharing the basin.
The UN Convention encourages the institution of international water regimes to
initiate and sustain water sharing and protect the environment. Currently, there are
different perspectives as to how international water regimes are founded. According to a
realist perspective, international water regimes form because of a sharp asymmetry in the
military and economic power among states. Consequently, international regimes are
created to serve the interests of hegemonic powers and when their potentials decline,
regimes weaken and collapse. In contrast, neoliberals contend that international regimes
come into being as a result of demand. While different situations exhibit various forms of
cooperation with varying degrees of coercion, the demand for regimes is always present
where a river is shared by at least two countries.
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A comprehensive water regime needs to include a wide array of solutions so as to
accommodate the diverse interests, strategies and values. Dinar and Wolf (1997) argue
that economic efficiency alone is not sufficient for cooperation, especially when it is
related to the allocation of a scarce resource, such as water. Furthermore, the authors
develop a framework for analyzing the economic and political aspects of cooperation and
demonstrate, using the case of trading Nile water, how regional cooperative arrangements
based only on economic considerations are inferior to arrangements that likewise take
into account political considerations.
Just and Netanyahu (2004) discuss cooperation in the context of a multiriparian
river basin. According to them, coalitions are more sustainable when they incorporate a
smaller number of players, rather than a larger number. This may be relevant in cases
where cooperation is lacking, yet a large number of riparians can make treaty formation
difficult, if not impossible. The authors argue that multilateral coordination in river basins
with a large number of riparians may have to be preceded by bilateral agreements first –
since they are easier to sustain. Nevertheless, bilateral treaty formation can be conducive
to the alliance-building processes within a basin, whereby states or groups thereof can
become confronted on water issues. By and large, bilateral treaty formation occurs
between countries similarly positioned in terms of geopolitical influence or where the
convergence of their strategic and economic interests is significant. Otherwise, a grand
coalition incorporating all river riparians is the solution. However difficult to accomplish,
it is associated with the highest total benefit from cooperation.
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The Assessment of Conflict Probability in the Aral Sea Basin
With the demise of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became engulfed in the cycles
of interstate disputes related to the utilization of regional waters. The Amu Darya and the
Syr Darya Rivers have become the main sources of contention after the five republics
gained their independence and the central authority in Moscow was no longer responsible
for handling the regional water affairs. Common ideological and political goals gave way
to sovereign nation-building projects in which water is used as a strategic instrument of
exerting the political pressure on the neighboring states and an impetus for economic
growth and social development. The rivers are now part of intensive debates between
upstream and downstream nations.
The Aral Sea Basin is formed by two of the largest rivers of Central Asia – the
Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The source of the Amu Darya is largely in Tajikistan,
with a few watercourses originating in northeastern Afghanistan. The Syr Darya
originates mainly in Kyrgyzstan. The Basin covers the areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as the southern part of Kazakhstan and the
northern part of Afghanistan and Iran (Dukhovny, Sokolov and Mukhamadiev 2006).
Tajikistan contributes 80% of the flow generated in the Amu Darya river basin, followed
by Afghanistan (8%), Uzbekistan (6%) and Kyrgyzstan (3%). Turkmenistan and Iran
together contribute around 3%. Although it carries less water than the Amu Darya, the
Syr Darya is the longest river in Central Asia. It flows from the Tien Shan Mountains,
along the borders of and across four states – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kazakhstan – before flowing into the Aral Sea. Kyrgyzstan contributes 74% of the river
flow, followed by Kazakhstan (12%), Uzbekistan (11%) and Tajikistan (3%). Both rivers
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have an extended network of dams, reservoirs and irrigation canals, resulting in one of
the most sophisticated water systems in the world.
The old Soviet water sharing system remained in place until recently when the
countries became confronted with the sky-rocketed world prices on fossil fuels and when
the old system of barter deals proved inefficient devoid of the central command authority.
The inability to purchase natural gas from abroad forced Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to
switch in the operation of their main water reservoirs from irrigation to power generation.
This resulted in a change of the natural regime of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya
rivers. Winter floods became frequent and river runoff during the vegetation period was
considerably reduced. This resulted in the reduction of the productivity of irrigated areas
and increased the economic losses in irrigation farming in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
especially during low-water periods.
Today, water policies are antagonizing neighbors and in some cases leading to
conflict. Current water management practices, where each state is exploiting water at the
expense of its neighbors while paying no respect to cooperation, are not sustainable.
Soviet engineers designed the water regulation system in such a way as to provide
downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with sufficient amounts of water during their
crop seasons in the summer, whereas the hydroelectric facilities in the territories of
upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were intended to control water flows, generate
electricity and prevent flooding. Downstream riparian nations were the core of the Soviet
plans of expanding their agricultural productivity, mainly through water-thirsty crops –
cotton and rice. The gargantuan river diversion projects that were intended to feed the
extensive irrigation networks ultimately led to the most devastating environmental and
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social impacts in the entire Aral Sea Basin. The fourth largest lake in the world had lost
two-thirds of its original volume in a matter of few decades. Accompanied by the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, it led to severe economic impacts for the nations of
the region. Industries and communities that depended on the sea vanished and
competition for increasingly scarce water has been rising among the growing populations
ever since. The aspirations of the Soviet leaders to surpass the West during the Cold War
by all means, including human and environmental, resulted in enormous costs that
continue to plague the entire region.
By early 1980s, the Soviet Union became the second largest cotton producer in
the world, accounting for nearly 20 percent of the world‘s production. To achieve
economic growth, Soviet planners thus allocated most of the available water resources in
Central Asia to develop and support a monocrop economy, not taking into account the
social costs in terms of the health of the population and the consequences for the
environment (Weinthal 2002). Allouche (2007) claims that the Central Asian water crisis
is more the result of bad management and disproportionate allocation among the riparians
than the consequence of scarcity. The deeply flawed management system, endemic
corruption, poor irrigation networks, weak governance structures, absence or lack of
political will and a reduction in external involvement and investments all contribute to
and exacerbate the crisis in the Aral Sea Basin.
While outright resource wars have been avoided, the five nations have been at
odds with each other adopting a zero-sum attitude – each country acts to maximize its
water allocation to either sustain high levels of cotton cultivation or produce excess
amounts of hydroelectricity for exporting purposes without reference to regional needs,
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planning, or the consequences to the environment of the basin. Cotton cultivation evolved
into the dominant economic activity in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In
Uzbekistan alone, the cotton sector produced more than 65 percent of the republic‘s gross
domestic output, consumed 60 percent of all resources, and employed approximately 40
percent of the labor force by the mid 1980s; the republic accounted for approximately
two-thirds of the cotton produced in the Soviet Union (Weinthal 2002).
The countries of Central Asia are among the poorest in the world in terms of their
GDP and per capita incomes. The majority of the population in the republics is employed
in the agricultural sector and is highly dependent on subsistence crops. The aspirations of
upstream countries to increase their hydropower generation capacities by constructing
massive dams and power generation facilities without a proper consideration of the
potential environmental and political effects threatens to disrupt the existing regional
agreements and lead to conflicts. The Rogun dam, in Tajikistan, is planned for a height of
335 meters. The construction started in 1976, but never finished since the break-up of the
Soviet Union and Tajikistan‘s subsequent civil war brought construction to a halt in 1991.
Now the Tajik government plans to complete the project without regard to the principles
enshrined in the UN framework convention. Unilateral diversion of river flow will
diminish the existing level of cooperation in the region and lead to contention. The
construction of the Rogun dam, which Tajikistan sees as the only viable solution to the
ongoing economic recession, will substantially reduce the river flow in downstream
countries. The dam is being built on the Vakhsh River. It includes other riparian states
that might be seriously affected by the disruption of river flow.
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The impounding of a reservoir behind a dam generally reduces the water flow
downstream to zero. It is during this period that conflicts are most likely to erupt. For
instance, the impounding of the Ataturk Dam in Turkey impeded the water flow of the
Euphrates River in Syria and Iraq for one month. Although no open military conflicts
occurred over that period, the countries officially protested unilateral undertakings of
such nature. Water facilities can become targets for airstrikes and ground military
operations that may well escalate into a large-scale interstate war.
However, even if Tajikistan were able to attract the necessary investments for the
projects, the country would encounter significant problems in selling the surplus power
generated, as the current electrical energy grid in the region is focused in Tashkent, the
capital of Uzbekistan. To resolve this problem, Tajikistan is teaming up with Kyrgyzstan
to create a north-south transmission line to link the two states with Kazakhstan and
bypass Uzbekistan altogether (Allouche 2007). Most recently, Tajikistan‘s government
launched the Initial Public Offering (IPO) to facilitate nation-wide investments for the
Rogun power plant project. International donor organizations and external state actors
refuse to invest in such projects as they tend to destabilize the political situation and
create environmental hazards.
Large-scale unilateral construction projects on rivers can be vulnerable to attacks
by the opposing countries, such as in case of Israel and Syria. Israel conducted airstrikes
against targets in Syria when it attempted to disrupt the water flow to Israel by building
dams on the Jordan River. Once built, however, dams act as deterrents of interstate
conflict. Massive hydroelectric facilities, such as dams, are large enough to pose an
enormous environmental threat to the entire region in case of destruction or significant
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damage. As a result, a protective aura of illegitimacy also develops to make attacks on
these targets less likely after they are built. For example, although the Israelis have stated
that they do not regard the Aswan High Dam as off-limits to military attack, they are
aware of the enormous price they would have to pay in international condemnation, costs
to the ecosystem and populations of the basin. If such a major hydro installation were
attacked, the reaction on the part of the victim would be extreme. Therefore, large-scale
hydro facilities probably restrain conflict, yet if attacked, they seriously aggravate it.
Upstream countries have not been able to produce sufficient amounts of hydroelectricity
because the water levels in their reservoirs remained low as a result of climatic changes
in the basin. The degrading water supply system will soon become inoperable, if further
investments are not secured to finance their reconstruction and replacement. The
population of Central Asia is expected to double in the next fifty years. Unilateral
development projects on rivers can only aggravate water scarcity and provoke some form
of hostility. Therefore, it is highly important to make a special consideration not only of
the potential dangers to the environment, but also of the social and economic costs that
such projects are likely to produce across the border.
Weinthal (2002) asserts that international aid organizations and INGOs had
contributed to enhancing the regional cooperation and reinforced the republics‘
sovereignty in early to late-1990s. According to her, the absence of substantial interstate
water conflicts in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union can be explained by
the desire of the elites in the five republics to consolidate statehood through the
accumulation of credibility and international recognition. In other words, it was in the
national interests of all republics to cooperate on water issues. The active role of the
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international community in the form of IOs and NGOs impels institution building at both
the international and the domestic level by simultaneously inducing cooperation and
reinforcing empirical sovereignty. ―
If these transnational actors did not behave
purposively and assume such a comprehensive role, other outcomes might have
transpired such as inertia, a different form of state building, or a lack of cooperation‖
(Weinthal 2002, 67).
However, now that the states have gained a degree of international recognition,
they more often tend to ignore the principles set forth in the 1992 Almaty Declaration.
Efforts to institute an effective regional water governance system have proved
ineffective, and increasing tensions are threatening regional security. Without genuine
cooperation in the region, one might expect political and economic instability, and
increased local violence. The 1992 agreement on water sharing in Central Asia
represented a quick response to a very fluid and ambiguous situation. It did not constitute
sustainable environmental cooperation among independent actors with well-defined
interests. Weinthal (2002) explains the initial success of cooperative efforts as inertia –
―
not wanting to disrupt from past practices, especially since the leaders were essentially
concerned with bringing in the cotton harvest‖ (p. 125). The Almaty Agreement
established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which was
composed of the five ministers of water management. The ICWC has a number of
deficiencies that inhibit the functioning of the organization in an adequate fashion. The
most important one is that this institution has been created under a strong influence of
international organizations and states have been quite reluctant to cooperate thereafter.
The result is that many commitments and agreements are not honored. Another problem
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lies in the structural nature of the organization, flawed representation scheme, and the
location of the headquarters in Uzbekistan, making it appear as a special-interest
institution.
Water Tensions in South Asia
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin covers the areas of China, India,
Bhutan and Bangladesh. The GBM basin is the most populous area in the world with a
population density of around 700 per sq. km. The basin as a whole, covers approximately
1% of the Earth‘s total land surface, is home to 10% of the world‘s population and
contains the largest concentration of poor on the planet (Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf
2002). Moreover, the region experiences one of the highest population growth rates in
the world. Political collisions and military conflicts among nations have become common
after the partition of the British India into the independent states of India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
Water occupies a critical niche in the domestic economies of all countries and the
demands for freshwater resources will undoubtedly increase along with the rising
consumption. ―
Agriculture accounts for nearly one-half of all freshwater usage in the
basin, making water supply one of the most significant barriers to economic
development‖ (Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007, 254). The GBM system is
considered to be one transboundary river basin even though the three rivers of this system
have certain distinct characteristics and flow through very different regions for most parts
of their lengths. The disproportionate spatial and temporal distribution of water flows
results in some adverse environmental effects. For instance, during the monsoon season,
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from June to October, there is abundant water, but during non-monsoon months the
countries become water-stressed (Rahaman 2006).
The conflict over the Ganges water between Bangladesh and India dates back to
1951 when India decided to construct the Farakka Barrage in order to divert water from
the Ganges to the Hooghly River by a 42-kilometer long feeder canal (Rahaman 2006).
The unilateral diversion of the Ganges water by India at Farakka Barrage has caused a
series of adverse environmental and ecological problems in Bangladesh (Khalequzzaman
1993). The Farakka Barrage gave India significant control over the water flow in
Bangladesh. Since most of Bangladesh‘s water sources originate outside its territory, it
became vulnerable to any quantitative and qualitative impacts caused by actions in India.
These impacts include shortage of water flow in the dry season affecting irrigated
agriculture and devastating floods in the wet season. The Farakka Barrage has
contributed to 50% decline in the dry season flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh (Dinar,
Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007). Wilson questions the utility of the Farakka
Barrage:
It is difficult to tell how far it has contributed to the increase in the draught
of the Hooghy, but it has not rescued Calcutta Port. The decline of the port
was not caused by physical constraints on the river, but by the slow rate of
industrial growth in the hinterland of the port. (Crow, Lindquist, and
Wilson 1995, 158)
India prefers to negotiate water sharing with its neighbors bilaterally whose
leaders have signed separate treaties, agreements and memorandums with Nepal, Bhutan
and Pakistan on water sharing of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Indus rivers, respectively.
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Bangladesh prefers the involvement of all riparians in the designing of a regional water
resources development plan. Bangladesh, as a weaker nation, has long been trying to
attract the attention of the international community to the problem of deficient water
supplies as a result of India‘s actions upstream. The lack of a workable management plan
for water allocation to Bangladesh has created a situation where irrigation of crops and
navigation are impossible during the summer months. Although the 1995 Water Treaty
between India and Bangladesh explicitly upholds the principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization of water supplies, the Treaty does not provide any mechanism to
approach other riparian countries of the Ganges basin for finding out a long-term
sustainable solution of the current crisis and for integrated management of the basin
(Rahaman 2006). In addition, the Joint River Commission has not been equipped with a
significant political authority and responsibility to implement the terms of the Treaty.
This constitutes a serious impediment to the achievement of a solid bilateral cooperation
between the two countries. There remains little doubt that if countries like India remain
reluctant to discuss or address the question of water allocation on a multilateral basis,
problems of water scarcity will persist and populations will be facing even greater
economic challenges. This can threaten the regional peace and lead to internal instability,
growing terrorist activities and international conflicts. It is essential for the hegemonic
countries to engage in the multilateral negotiation of allocation and regulation of shared
water resources.
Cooperation over the Indus River between India and Pakistan is a demonstration
of the potential for collaborative action yet to be explored in the GBM basin. Despite the
cycles of interstate hostility between the two countries, nuclear test explosions, ongoing
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terrorist activities in the region, the Indus Water Treaty remained intact and continued to
function. The agreement over the Indus River allowed for the division of the river‘s
tributaries between India and Pakistan. The nature of the agreement and the involvement
of the World Bank in the negotiation of the Treaty contributed to building cooperative
relations between the two countries. In the end, the World Bank became signatory to the
Indus Water Treaty.
Collaboration between Bhutan and India represents a salient example of how
transboundary water bodies can be used as an engine for economic growth or
development of an impoverished region with concomitant benefits to each country
(Biswas 2008). Following water cooperation initiatives have meant that Bhutan‘s per
capita GDP has increased from being the lowest of any South Asian countries in 1980s,
to being the second highest in the region at present, within a very brief time span of only
a little more than two decades (Biswas 2008). Many experts suggest that exploring
Nepal‘s extensive hydro potential collectively could boost the regional welfare. Bhaduri
proposes that a market-based water transfer has great relevance in resolving the
transboundary water conflict between India and Bangladesh (Bhaduri and Barbier 2003).
Water transfers from Nepal would augment the flow of water at Farakka during dry
seasons and periods of drought.
Ultimately, the efforts to eradicate terrorism and diminish interstate hostility will
largely depend on how well all countries of South Asia and the international community
will commit themselves to addressing the problems of endemic poverty, low living
standards, lack of access to adequate water supplies and the spread of disease by
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promoting a cohesive and joint water regulation system. India‘s cooperation in addressing
the regional economic challenges is of foremost importance for success.
The Dynamics of Water Tensions in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin
The Tigris and the Euphrates river systems are often considered to form a single
basin because both rivers in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway converge shortly before
emptying into the Persian Gulf. Both rivers originate in Turkey, traverse Syria and Iraq.
The Euphrates River is the longest in the Middle East. It originates in the eastern part of
Turkey, between Lake Van and Black Sea. It is estimated that 40% of the Euphrates
River is confined by Turkey‘s boundaries, while 25% is in Syria and 35% in Iraq.
According to Akanda, Freeman, and Placht (2007), disputes over water allocation
between the three countries are likely to aggravate in the future. Driven by a number of
objectives, the riparian countries have often been at odds over the utilization of the
Euphrates River waters. Food and energy security are the primary concerns for Iraq and
Turkey. Population growth amplifies the demand placed on food and energy supplies and
increases the prospect of further discontent over the existing water allocation quotas.
Both Syria and Iraq have announced their goals of developing food sufficiency programs,
whereas Turkey‘s hydro-energy development plans threaten to undermine any of the
proposed downstream projects without a joint consultation and management strategy.
Being an upstream country, Turkey enjoys a substantial degree of control over the
Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers. The initiation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project
(GAP) by Turkey has created exceeding pressures on the water system of the rivers. The
project includes the construction of 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants and irrigation
facilities to serve 1.7 million hectares of land, totally owned by the local population of
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the region (Kibaroglu and Unver 2000). Turkey aspires to reduce the dependence on
expensive fuel imports by producing at least 40 percent of its required energy from
domestic hydroelectric sources. The GAP hydroelectric project was expected to save the
country about 28 million tons of oil imports annually. In 2001, Syria and Iraq were net
exporters of fuel as opposed to Turkey, which, significantly had to import approximately
63 percent of fuel (Akanda, Freeman, and Placht 2007). Turkey‘s leaders often refer to
the country‘s hydro resources as their only natural assets; in the same manner oil is
treated in Iraq and Syria. As was mentioned earlier, claiming absolute rights on river
flows poses dangers to international peace in the region. Turkey‘s leaders contend that
while the water is in Turkish territory, it is the sole property of Turkey. Turkey may
choose to obstruct, divert, sell or even share it, but the water flows remain the exclusive
property of Turkey just as oil is the property of the Arab state in which it sits. ―
However,
as the modern move away from the Harmon Doctrine and recent internationally adopted
definitions of watercourses illustrate, the comparison drawn between Arab oil and the
waters of the Euphrates-Tigris is inaccurate‖ (Hakki 2006, 9). ―
The loss of one-half and
two-thirds of Iraqi and Syrian water supply, respectively, from the Euphrates Basin is a
viable cause for alarm‖ (Hakki, 2006, 4).
Turkey is the only country in the Euphrates basin to not have signed the UN
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. According to
sources in Turkey, if signed, the Convention would give the other riparian nations a veto
power over Turkey‘s development projects. The GAP project has strong political
implications since it aims to develop the part of the country mainly populated by ethnic
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Kurds. This would enable the Turkish elites to consolidate their rule throughout the
nation and eliminate all forms of dissent.
Syria and Iraq insist on the equal division of waters of both rivers, while Turkey
contends that the equality approach would not meet its energy and agriculture needs and
instead proposes an equity-centered solution. Turkey‘s leaders maintain that their
population demands are higher than in the neighboring countries; therefore, pursuing
higher water allocations from the Tigris-Euphrates system is in line with international
normative standards.
Ultimately, it is probable that Turkey will be compelled to negotiate a feasible
water agreement in order to secure a peaceful regional environment. International peace
is the essential condition for promoting the domestic economic growth and development
– the fact that the leaders of all riparian countries have to accept and achieve. More
importantly, Turkey is obliged to engage in the trilateral talks concerning appropriate
water allocations in order to secure external funding and membership in the European
Union. Syria and Iraq are also expected to participate in the water negotiations in order to
win the international trust and recognition in the wake of the internal political instability
in these countries. The riparian countries have a full potential to stimulate the processes
leading to the formation of a basin-wide economic system and an integrated water
management structure whose underlying goal would be to promote the sharing of benefits
among nations. Enhanced trade links will inevitably reduce interstate hostility and
suspicion. It will be important to include Iraq in any of the cooperative arrangements so
as to foster a basin-wide effort. Interdependency links engendered by a collective
management of water will assist in the transition processes in Iraq and help build a solid
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market economy and free society there after decades of political turmoil. Hakki (2006)
asserts that ―oneway in which Turkey might contribute to alleviating the water dispute
with Syria and Iraq is through exportation of electricity through bargain prices‖ (p. 16).
In return, the countries can supply oil and gas to Turkey and receive sufficient amounts of
water for irrigation and consumption.
Experience suggests that external actors, whether countries or international
organizations, can be instrumental in initiating a dialogue between the three countries.
Akanda, Freeman, and Placht (2007) propose that ―
only an external mediator has the
ability to highlight the incentives and frame the issues in such a way that each country
believes it has something to gain by coming to the table and something to lose by
avoiding negotiations‖ (p. 5). Each country has put forward an approach for how water
should be shared in the region. Syria and Iraq propose the vastly different methodology
of sharing river flows. The task for the mediators would be to reconcile these diverging
approaches to shared rivers.
Conclusions and Implications for the Future
The case studies examined in this article demonstrate that unilateral diversion of
rivers can provoke political and military tensions and destabilize the economic security in
drainage basins. Water scarcity will add fuel to interstate contention and instigate water
wars absent proper precautionary measures. Population growth, environmental
deterioration and climate change conditions may diminish the quality and quantity of
potable water, result in natural disasters of even greater magnitude and further increase a
social discontent across the planet. Under these adverse circumstances, unilateral
diversion of water flows can ignite international conflicts and lead to significant human
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and environmental losses. The unprecedented global population growth will inevitably
stimulate the competition for freshwater and create extreme pressures on governments,
under which it will be difficult to ignore the interests of all riparian nations while
pursuing sovereign economic interests associated with the exploitation of water flows.
Many studies related to water resources underscore that disputes over freshwater
tend to fall short of conflicts and generally result in a peaceful resolution. Yoffe et al.
(2004) found that international relations over freshwater resources are overwhelmingly
cooperative and cover a wide range of issue areas, including water quantity, quality, joint
management and hydropower. However, in the future, certain river basins may be more
likely to give rise to interstate hostility than others because of record-breaking population
and poverty growth rates. The falling availability of freshwater on a per capita basis in
the developing world can easily provoke a social discontent and lead to a large-scale
warfare between and within countries. It is therefore imperative to direct more resources
and potential into these regions in order to mitigate these dire situations, promote and
sustain multinational water regimes and the sharing of benefits from the collective
exploitation of water flows.
Unilateral practices of water diversion are conducive to inequitable distribution of
water quantities which provides fertile ground for contention and conflict among nationstates and social groups. Social and economic security of populations is essential for
promoting and sustaining peace in river basins. Inequitable distribution of water among
states fosters perceptions of injustice and situations of insecurity among populations of
river basins and results in ways of seeking redress that go beyond the limits set forth by
international legal norms and treaties. State policies have to aim to promote the rights of
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populations to freshwater and to the benefits from the exploitation of water flows not
only within the territorial confines of their nation-states but also with an eye on the needs
for water across their borders so as to achieve a basin-wide peace and sustainable
economic development. Since peace is the essential condition for the long-term
development and stability, states have to increasingly accommodate the interests of all
the populations inhabiting a river basin as it will maximize the benefits of multinational
water treaties and reinforce a political stability.
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